Abstract
The Nabhānī State first
appeared in Oman in the 6th/12th century and lasted till the 11th/17th century.
During this period the fall of Baghdad, which occurred in 656/1258, led to a
number of radical political and cultural changes in the Gulf region, and the
aim of the present study is to re-evaluate the conclusions of the (2002) study
against a wider background. In doing so it will firstly re-evaluate the
original and modern sources dealing with that period. Secondly, it will take a
broader look at the political and regional situation at that time and its
impact on the course of Oman’s historical development – in other words, it will
consider Omani history within a regional context. Thirdly, it will look for the roots of that
state and relate it more accurately to Oman’s historical chronology and
regional context.
1 Introduction
Studying the Nabhānī dynasty in Oman
(13th-17th century CE) has proved problematic for researchers, mainly for two
reasons: firstly, a dearth of written historical records means that it has not
been possible to identify the sequence of events and chronological history
during the Nabhānī era with any clarity. Indeed, the prime source of
information available to researchers on that state’s political life is still
the poetry written during that period. Secondly, there are a plethora of
coincidental historical events during that same period following the fall of
Baghdad in 1258, which led to a radical change in the shipping routes between
the Gulf and the Red Sea. One factor that affected the shipping was the
emergence of numerous emirates and of the Kingdom of Hormuz before the Safavid
era. This was followed by the European voyages of exploration and the
Portuguese occupation of the Omani coast, which began in 1507. All these events
produced a range of conflicting views among historians – a situation that was
further complicated by the fact that the Portuguese documents on Oman during
the 16th century include no reference whatsoever to the Nabhānīs. A brief
glance at the books that have been written about the Nabhānī state will reveal
four different lines of approach:
1-
A “general historical approach” to the
Nabhānīs as a ruling dynasty. While this approach is generally common to all
historians writing about that period, gaps soon begin to appear in the
chronology of Oman’s history during that era. Accordingly, the only way
historians have been able to tackle the subject is by examining its different
elements in isolation from each other. This was what both Ibn Ruzayq and de
Zambaur did. The latter wrote a study on the line of succession of some of the
Nabhānī Sultans, attempting to produce a complete, or quasi-complete, picture
of the historical chronology of Oman between the 12th and 16th centuries.
However, it soon becomes apparent that what they actually created was a
mosaic-like “composite” of different bits and pieces rather than a true
picture, with the result that some researchers have found it difficult to
understand where the different historical events fit in relation to each other.
Bosworth’s response to the problem was to ignore that period in its entirety,
as if it had never existed, while others have described it as “Oman’s Dark
Ages” or a lacuna in the Omani history.
2-
A “piecemeal approach” involving the
study of specific aspects or historical events to the exclusion of others. Here
researchers have often focused their attention on the poetry, architecture,
etc. of the relevant period.
3-
A “parallel approach” which treats
the Sultans and Imams separately. This is found particularly in the writings of
Nūr al-Dīn al-Sālimī (d. 1914), who distinguishes between the mutaqaddimūn
(“early”) Nabhānīs and the mutaʾaḫḫirūn (“late”) Nabhānīs – a
distinction which has proved very useful for understanding the history of Nabhānī
rule. He was followed by Muḥammad al-Sālimī (d. 1985), who wrote about the
history of the “late” Nabhānīs in his book Nahḍat al-aʿyān (Resurgence
of the People of Substance). Then in his biographical studies on Oman’s ʿulamāʾ
(religious scholars) in the volumes 2 and 3 of his book Itḥāf al-aʿyān
(Portraits of the People of Substance), Sayf b. Ḥamūd al-Battāšī (d. 1999)
offered a new angle on that period through a series of thumbnail sketches of
its leading ʿulamāʾ.
4-
Finally, Abdulrahman al-Salimi took
a fresh look at the subject concluding that the “late” Nabhānī state was a
decentralised state, and therefore that its overall structure could only be
understood as a whole through an examination of its individual component parts.
This study will try to resolve these
problems by offering some additional conclusions and observations to those made
in our previous study in 2002, while examining the subject from a wide range of
hitherto unexplored angles. These new angles may well prove useful to future
researchers while at the same time providing us with the guidelines we need for
our own purposes. Briefly, these new angles may be summarised as follows:
1.1 The Conflict among the ʿulamāʾ after
the Third Imamate in Oman
The third imamate – which began with the imām
Rāšid bin Saʿīd (r. in 445/ 1058), who defeated the Makramid (r.
390-442/945-1055), backed by the Buyid – lasted for around a century and a
half. Its last imāms in the 6th/12th century were Mūsā b. Abī al-Maʿālī, Muḥammad
b. Ḫanbaš and Muḥammad b. Ġassān. After they died, a schism occurred between
the ʿulamāʾ, as a result of which Oman became fragmented into separate
regions. This was something Omanis had never anticipated, particularly the Ibāḍī
ʿulamāʾ, whose concept of politics did not allow for such a possibility.
Subsequently, the rift between the Rustāq group and the Nizwā group came to a
head. At the same time, two highly significant strands emerged which were to
have a major effect on the lives of the Omani population in a way that they had
never experienced during previous historical eras. These two strands – poetry
and architecture – spread across the region through the influence of the
Buyids, who imposed the Širāz culture upon the areas under their rule, leaving
an impact which lasted for several centuries. Where architecture was concerned,
this effect was particularly apparent in the new decorated miḥrābs and
ornamental engravings, while the new literary style was exemplified by poets
such as Mihyār al-Daylamī and Abzūn/Ibzūn al-Maǧūsī. Consequently, new poetical
forms and styles began to emerge in Oman.
1.2 Širāz and Baḥrayn
When two great powers appeared on either
side of the Gulf – Širāz, which was the base of the Buyids and al-Aḥsāʾ, the
stronghold of the Carmathians – this led to clashes and political conflicts
which extended from northern Oman to Baghdad. These in turn produced a series
of unexpected alliances. Širāz imposed a new Persian cultural hegemony on the
region, and after the demise of the Buyid in Širāz at the hands of the Seljuks,
a mawlā (protégé) of the Seljuks by the name of Sanqar b. Mawdūd seized
control of the Fars region and established the Salgurid – or Khorezm šāh –
dynasty which continued to rule until 1264. The major event mentioned in Omani
historical sources about the Širāzī, was a military campaign led by the Emir Faḫr
al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn al-Dāyīʾa with his brother in 674/1275-6 and they were able to
reach Bahlā and then Nizwā, which was under siege for over four months. The
Nabhānī Sultan ʿUmar b. Nabhān defeated them and Ibn al-Dāyīʾa died. A year
later in 675/1276 the northern tribes of Oman, al-Ḥaddān allied with the tribe
of Awlād al-Rayīs/Riyāysa, who dominated the eastern Musandam, rode into Nizwā
and destroyed a part of the city. However, the Sultan ʿUmar b. Nabhān came
later and crushed them and they were never restored since then.
In
al-Aḥsāʾ/Baḥrayn the Carmathians were able to dominate their side of the Gulf
both politically and economically after the region had become marginalised, and
their influence continued even after their fall at the hands of the ʿUyīnids
(1067-1253) and, subsequently, during the rule of the ʿUsfūrids (1252-1417)
under ʿUsfūr b. Rāšid. These rulers combined forces with the then Kingdom of
Hormuz to extend their power over Baḥrayn and Qatif. Their influence continued
to expand until the arrival of the Banū ʿAmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿah tribes led by Zāmil
b. Ḥusayn b. Ğabr, chief of the Banū Ğabr, who established the Banū Ğabr state
(1417-1521). With the migration of the ʿAmir b. Saʿsaʿah tribes from Nağd to
the shores of the Gulf the resulting hotchpotch of competing influences led to
renewed clashes, following which the Banū ʿAbdul Qays tribes came to dominate
the region for centuries. Most of them were Shiite and had controlled the coast
of al-Aḥsāʾ since the pre-Islamic era.
However,
the arrival of the immigrant Banū ʿAmir tribes brought about a fundamental
change in the tribal composition of Eastern Arabia, and their gradual expansion
towards the east brought them into contact with the Omani tribes, who provided
them with support in their confrontation with their rivals, so that the tribal
alliances with the Nabhānīs came to represent a new force. The Banū Ǧabr were
Maliki Sunnis. The successive waves of migration led to a gradual break-up of
the old tribal alliances which had been dominated in Oman by the Azd ʿImrān and
Banū Sāmah, where the civil war eroded the alliance between the Banū Sāmah and Ḥaddān
against the ʿAtīk and other Azd tribes.
1.3 The Role of Qays (Qiš)/Hormuz
The Banū ʿAmāra, who were descendants of
al-Ǧulandā b. Karkar (of the Banū Sulayma b. Mālik b. Fahm of Azd), dominated
the trade at the entrance to the Gulf, where they diverted some of the trade
through Kerman, Sijistan, Khurasan and Central Asia. Wilkinson attempted to
restructure the image of Banū Sulayma especially as the coastal region was
known as Sayf banī ʿUmmāra. According to Arab geographers, they continued to
control the islands there between the 3rd and 6th/9th and 12th centuries,
though in the 4th/10th century they came into conflict with the Buyid when
ʿAdūd al-Dawla captured some of their islands at the entrance to the Gulf.
However, they later regained control and played the leading role in the tribal
alliances. When the port of Sirāf was severely damaged by an earthquake in
367/977, Qays (Qiš)/ Huzu islands quickly began to compete with Sohar (Ṣuḥār),
while exploiting Siraf’s difficulties. In the 6th/12th century Ibn Aṯīr wrote
that in the year 495/1100 an emir expanded his territory along the borders of
the Gulf and to the south of it towards Qalhāt, which replaced the port of
Sohar after the latter had been destroyed.
1.4 The Military States and Their Systems
By the beginning of the 7th/13th century we
come across an important new development in the structure of the Islamic state
which we might call the “military monarchy”. “Military” ruling families first
appeared on the scene during the Crusades with the rise of the Ayyubids and
subsequently the Mameluke state; they were an “extension” of the Seljuks, whom
the Mamelukes ultimately replaced in the 7th/13th century. Here we can see
parallels with the Nabhānī state in three respects:
1-
A parallel power structure within
the state.
2-
Different allegiances within the
state suggesting that it had a decentralised structure.
3-
Similarities in the decision-making
process. However, although not everything that was true of the Mamelukes
applied to all the dynasties at that time, there were many similarities with,
for example, the Rasulids in Yemen and the Turkish states in Iran before the
Safavids came to power. The significant factor here is that there was a change
in the way power was exercised within the “Islamic structure” at that time.
1.5 The Expansion of Nabhānīd’s Trade in the
Indian Ocean
We do not intend to go into detail
regarding the trade scene in the Indian Ocean during this period. That is
really the province of the maritime historians. However, although it is certain
that maritime trade brought about great changes between the 12th and 16th
centuries CE, what concerns us here is the fact that the last of the Nabhānī
Sultans of the first period went and founded the city of Pate in East Africa,
while another branch of the Nabhānī family was established from the descendants
of Sulṭān Sulyamān b. Sulaymān b. al-Muẓaffar. The remains of old Pate town
cover an area of about 27 hectares. It must have been an impressive settlement.
The ruins of not less than ten mosques are recorded. Only one of these might
predate the 18th century. The houses are built of stone. Many old walls are
partially integrated into new buildings. In the “Chronicle of Pate”, one of the
Nabhānī, Sulaymān b. Sulaymān b. Muẓaffar al-Nabhān, is mentioned as the
founder of the Nabhānī dynasty of Pate. According to this tradition, he had
come from Oman to Pate in 1203. The reason for his coming to Pate given there
was that he had been defeated by the Yaʿrubī in Oman. Since we know that the
Yaʿrubī came to power in Oman much later (1624-1741), this founding legend is
a-historical. The interesting fact is that, according to the Chronicle,
Sulaymān married the daughter of an Arab ruler of Pate. This may be true, and
the Arab ruler of Pate might have been of Omani origin too, perhaps one of the
Ǧulandā, who had emigrated from Oman to East Africa in the early Islamic
period, or a descendent of another Omani leader or tribe who had to leave Oman
in a later period.
It
is more than probable that the Nabhānī already had contacts with the East Coast
of Africa after they came to power in Oman. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that
this Sulaymān b. Sulaymān was a Nabhānī who had come to East Africa before the
downfall of the Nabhānī in Oman, and who might have married into the ruling
family of the town. Reliable chronological data is rare. Therefore any attempt
to bring a certain degree of clarity into the chronology of the rulers of Pate
starts with conjectures based on the Chronicle.
Pate
is not mentioned by the early Arabic geographers or historians, and even the famous
traveller Ibn Baṭṭūta (1304-1377) does not mention the town or the island in
the 14th century. It is not until the 16th century that Pate is mentioned in
Portuguese sources. Beginning in this period, the rise of Pate is demonstrated
by written sources, including the “Chronicle of Pate”, as well as by
archaeological evidence. In 1966 Chittick25 surveyed in Pate and excavated
seven test pits. Shards collected in Pate, prove a certain wealth in the city
of the 16th century, and a possible connection with Oman via the so-called
“Bahlā”-ware, a pottery type which might have originated in the 14th/15th century
and was common in Oman until very recently.
To
sum up, if this line of descent is correct, some scholars – according to
Neville Chittick – have traced it back to before the beginning of the 13th century
CE. Moreover, Wilkinson has taken a close look at the subject in his studies of
al-Qalhātī’s al-Sīra al-Kilwiyya – which shows that a turning point was
reached in Omani-African relations during that phase of the Nabhānī period,
when the sea trade routes expanded along the shores of the Indian Ocean.
2 The Emergence of the Nabhānīs
Researchers on the
Nabhānīs generally start by looking at what the poetry anthologies from that
time have to say. These are the primary sources, since they are contemporaneous
and most of the poets enjoyed a close relationship with the Nabhānī Sultans.
Indeed, all the information on that era is taken from the anthologies of poets
like al-Satālī, al-Nabhānī or al-Kiḏāwī, or poetry by other contemporaries like
Aḥmad b. Maǧīd. Historians divide the Nabhānī era into two periods:
1-
The first period –
known as the mutaqaddimūn (“early”) Nabhānīs – begins as they emerge
from obscurity towards the close of the time of conflict between the Ibāḍī
Imāms in Oman and ends with Muḥammad b. Ḫanbaš (d. 557/1162) and Mūsā b. Abī
ʾl-Maʿālī (6th/12th). The schisms between the Imāms convey the impression that
they declined to a level lower than that of imāmat al-ẓuhūr (literally
“imamate at proclamation level”), so they were at either the difāʿ
(“Defence”) or širāʾ (“Sacrifice of one’s life”) level.
2-
The second period
known as the mutaʾaḫḫirūn (“later”) Nabhānīs - lasted from 906/1500 to
1034/1624.
Nearly all Omani
historians follow the system established by Ibn Ruzayq when he recounted the
genealogy of the Al-Busaʿīdī dynasty (r. 1743-Present). In his book al-Fatḥ
al-Mubīn (The Clear Victory), Ibn Ruzayq claims that the Nabhānīs
are descendants of the ʿAtīk branch of Azd. He also mentions them in al-Ṣaḥīfa
al-Qaḥtāniyya (The Qaḥtānī Page). Omani historians are virtually
unanimous about this. They also agree that the Nabhānīs are not the same as the
Nabhānīs who live in the Aʿālī high district of Wādī Samāʾil in the interior
Oman, since the latter are from Tay tribe while the Nabhānīs are from the ʿAtīk
branch of Azd, and are recognized as hailing from Dibā.
When Nūr al-Dīn al-Sālimī (d. 1914)
embarked upon the task of separating the Nabhānī Sultans from the Imāms, this
helped create a much clearer picture of that period. Non-Omani sources include
the Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūta, who wrote about his visits to Oman during
that time. However, despite the importance of his observations, al-Sālimī
doubts that he ever actually reached Oman’s interior – a view endorsed by John
Wilkinson who believes that although he reached the country’s coastal regions
(he was certainly in Qalhāt), what he wrote about the interior of Oman and his
meeting with the Nabhānī Sultan in Nizwā was mere hearsay based on reports from
members of the general public while he was on the coast. This is most likely to
be the case, considering the fact that it would have taken considerably longer
to make such a journey than Ibn Baṭṭūta suggests. Moreover, Ibn Baṭṭūta
includes no descriptions of his alleged journey between Qalhāt and Nizwā – in
either direction – or the towns and other places he would have passed through
on his route. Marco Polo (d. 1324) visited Qalhāt and recorded some of his
impressions of it, as did the Chinese admiral Zheng He (1371-1431) who visited
the town.
The Nabhānīs were
originally part of the Azd tribes’ second wave of migration to Oman. Azd is the
name of two historic Arab tribes who came to prominence after the collapse of
the Maʾrib Dam. The first migrated from the uplands of ʿAsīr and were known as
“Azd al-Surāt”, while the second, who lived in Oman, were known as “Azd ʿUmān”.
The first Azd migration to Oman was led by Mālik b. Fahm after the Maʾrib
events. However, historical sources do not mention the reasons for another
wave, when a group of individuals from Azd Šanūʾa abandoned their homeland in
Surāt and the Ḥiǧāz and crossed the desert of Arabia towards the end of the
first century BC and headed for Oman, where they settled in Dibā in the north
of the country.
According to old written
records of Oman’s tribal genealogies, the Nabhānīs are from the ʿAtīk branch of
Azd. After Mālik b. Fahm successive waves of Azd tribes migrated and settled in
Northern Oman. This is why genealogists class the Azd genealogy in Oman under
three separate headings according to which migration brought them to the
country:
The first group are the
tribal branches descended from Mālik b. Fahm, while the second trace their
descent from Naṣr b. Zahrān and are known as Azd Šanūʾa (al-Yaḥmad, al-Ḥaddān,
al-Maʿāwil). The last group are descended from ʿImrān b. ʿUmar b. Maziqiyā, who
was the forefather of al-Aswad, and are known as al ʿAtīk and al-Ḥaǧr.
While we have cited our
sources of information in the above paragraphs, few precise details are
actually available about the specific locations settled by the individual
tribes in their new homeland. If we turn to the Omani sources we will find – to
quote Kašf al-ġumma – that “the first Azd individuals to immigrate to
Oman after Mālik b. Fahm were ʿImrān b. ʿUmar b. ʿAmir Māʾ al-Samāʾ and his two
sons, al-Ḥaǧr and al-Aswad. The latter was the ancestor of the ʿAtīk branch of
Azd. They set up their tents along the north-western strip of Oman and settled
in the Dibā area beside the sea opposite the Persian ports, near some
settlements of another Arab tribe – the Ḥaddān.
The first settlement in
Dibā goes some way towards explaining how the ʿAtīk tribe came to become
incorporated into other Arab tribes, and this in turn indicates that the Omanis
came together as a people within the framework of the traditional Arab tribal
system, which provided them with the basic elements of their general political
system. During the first stage of the early Arab migration to Oman they tended
to settle on the edge of the desert on the western side of the mountains. The
only high areas they penetrated were at the far end of the mountain ranges,
where some tribal settlements developed along the southern and northern
migration routes, with the result that some other groups found themselves
driven towards – and then into – the mountain wādīs.
Essentially, there were no territorial
conflicts between the early settlers (i.e. the first Azd immigrants) and the
new arrivals (Azd Šanūʾa) who settled in the mountain pastures. This would
suggest that there was nothing to prevent them from becoming merged into a
common tribal political system, while questions regarding the leadership of the
group would have been resolved by a straight power struggle between any likely
contenders.
However, such struggles were not settled
without the intervention of neighbouring forces. In the 3rd century CE the
Sasanian King Ardašīr invaded Oman and this led to a vicious war with the local
Arab population. Subsequently, the Persians shared their rule with the Arab
inhabitants with the result that the Ǧulandā family ruled the Arab tribes in
the interior and mountain areas of the country while the Persians ruled the
coastal cities, ports and most of the agricultural areas on the plains.
The chiefs of the Arab tribes were happy
to unite under the political leadership of the Ǧulandās, thus creating a form
of state structure based upon a system of tribal alliances. Consequently, the
tribes enjoyed stable leadership in the settlements in the mountain, coastal
and desert areas where they lived, in which they controlled the water
resources. At the same time, in this situation the Maʿwalis – a baṭn
(clan) of the Ǧulandās – were able to dominate the alliances and set up their
capital in Sohar, while the ʿAtīk established themselves in Dibā. Thus led to a
struggle for supremacy between the two trading maritime outlets in the south
east of the Arabian Peninsula (i.e. Dibā and Sohar). In Sohar the Ğulandā chief
ʿAbdul ʿIzz launched an attack from his stronghold on the inhabitants of the
coast (the Ahl al-ʿabāb), who had settled in the Gulf during the era of
Persian rule.
After that the Arab tribes of ʿAtīk and
Awlād Šams (who were Ǧulandās) formed an alliance, they captured the coastal
ports and this gave them control of the maritime trade in the Gulf. One could perhaps
say that this development was only to be expected, since any rising political
power in Oman would feel naturally drawn to dominate the Gulf trade, and
Wilkinson makes it clear that tribe, maritime trade and imamate are the three
main elements that have shaped Oman’s culture and history.
There were two major factors behind the
expansion of trade in the Gulf at that time. The first of these was the
relationship between the Arabian Peninsula and Persia and the role of each in
controlling the Gulf’s sea trade. Secondly, the tribal groupings that inhabited
the interior and the mountains united and this gave a boost to the trade
between the interior and Sohar and Dibā. It is possible that the Maʿwālis did
not lead this movement, but were pushed into it by the Ḥaddān – one of the
neighbouring tribes – since they seem to have been the first to settle in the
mountain areas of al-Sirr and Yanqul (Ğabal al-Ḥaddān) and Tuwām (Buraymī). The
port of Dibā thrived during the pre-Islamic period; it was described as the
ancient capital of Oman, or, alternatively, as one of the markets and ports
controlled by the Arabs rather than the Sasanians. It would appear that where
the port of Sohar was concerned the Persians and Ğulandās reached a truce under
which they agreed to divide its tax revenues and share in its government.
Ibn Ḥabīb adds that the taxes from the
markets of Sohar and Dibā went to the Ğulandis – the rulers of Oman. Here we
should note the significance of Ibn Ḥabīb’s report in two respects. Firstly, he
insists that there was a link with China in the centuries before Islam; though
the evidence for such a link is extremely scanty, he notes that Dibā was a
market in which all the Arab traders met their counterparts from China, India
and Sind. Secondly, he shows that it was because Dibā was an Arab port – not a
Persian port – that the Ğulandās were the beneficiaries of its tolls and taxes.
3 The Transition from Tribalism to State
Authority
The power and authority of
Islam gave the local tribes an opportunity to rid themselves of the domination
of Persia, which was mainly centred on the coastal regions, and enabled Dibā to
reap the benefits of the maritime trade in the Gulf, so that it became a port
of major importance for the Omanis and the Persians were forced to leave. This
had a pronounced impact on the Arabs, who now had to decide on the nature of
their future relationship with the Persians, whose rule over them had come to
an end. The Arabs now took possession of the territory which had previously
been settled by the Persians, and this presented the Ğulandās with the
opportunity to extend their domination over the other Arab tribes.
While there are different versions of how precisely
the Omanis came to embrace Islam, it would be very hard to claim with any
certainty that al-Ğulandā b. al-Mustakbir’s two sons – Kings Ğayfar and ʿAbd –
accepted the Faith as a result of ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ’s mission in 8-10/630-632.
However, the important thing for us as far as we are concerned is that it
happened during the years prior to the death of the Prophet. At the same time,
we should also bear in mind that another significant event was the “wars of
apostasy” (ridda) that broke out in some parts of Arabia after the death
of the Prophet. These occurred basically because of disagreement over the
payment of the zakāt to al-Madīna.
In Oman, Dibā played an important role in
the war when they resisted Laqīt b. Mālik al-ʿAtīk, commander of the army that
had been sent from al-Madīna. The Ğulandās responded to the situation with
great caution and, while they did not agree with Dibā’s decision, they did not
force the town to adopt a contrary position. Consequently, the ʿAtīk branch of
Azd found itself alone in facing the Islamic army which had come to collect the
zakāt.
Each of the three accounts
of the subsequent events has provided later historians with their source
material for what happened at the Battle of Dibā, despite the fact that all
three versions “evolved” over the course of nearly a century following the
battle itself. According to the first version – which we can find in some Omani
historical works, including the epistles of Ḫalaf b. Ziyād al-Bahrānī (d.
130/740) and Abū Qaḥtān Ḫālid b. Qaḥtān (d. early 4th/10th century), as well as
al-Ansāb by al-ʿAwtabī (d. 6th/12th century) and Tuḥfa by
al-Sālimī (d. 1332/1914) – the war was caused by a mere misunderstanding
between the two sides and was not the result of apostasy on the part of the
people of Dibā.
The second and third versions are to be
found in old historical narratives, most of them taken from al-Wāqidī (b.
130/748) or al-Ṭabarī (b. 221/839). According to these versions, there was an
uprising of the ʿAtīk in Dibā and the subsequent Islamic attack upon them led
them to abandon their properties in Dibā and migrate gradually to Oman’s
interior regions. However, while this was the most important political event in
the ʿAtik’s history and marked their debut on the Omani political scene, it is
certain that some of the ʿAtīk’s descendants (including the Muḥallabis)
migrated to Basra in Iraq, thereby expanding the reach of that tribe and its
sub-branches.
The question may be asked: What form did
this migration to Oman’s interior take? Over the course of a century and a half
it had been the main political dynamic as far as the Ğulandis and Yaḥmadis were
concerned. However, the ʿAtīk were only just beginning to rise to prominence
and play an active role in Oman’s political life; indeed, most of the imāms
during Oman’s first imamate period were from the Yaḥmad tribes, with the
exception of Imām ʿAbd al-Mālik b. Ḥumayd (207-226/823-841), who was from the
ʿAtīk.
Until the end of the
3rd/9th century, and during the Omani Civil War, when the chief of the ʿAtīk
tribe was al-Ṣalt b. al-Naẓar b. Minhāl, the ʿAtīk joined forces with the Yaḥmadis
in supporting Imām ʿAzzān b. Tamīm. Later, al-Ṣalt and his sons al-Minhāl and
Ġassān were killed in the Battle of al Rawḍah (280/885). Al-Ṣalt was known as
“al-Hiǧārī” after al-Hiǧār a town in the north east of the Bāṭina region.
Later, the ʿAtīk in collaboration with the
Bedouin of Bilād al-Sirr supported the ʿAbbasids in ousting Imām Muḥammad b.
Yazīd at the end of the 3rd/9th century. The reports on the event could
indicate that by then the ʿAtīk had migrated through the wādīs of the Bāṭina
from Dibā to Bilād al-Sirr and established small settlements during the 3rd/9th
and 4th/10th centuries in the areas between the coast and the interior.
However, they made Bahlā their base during these population movements, and
Wilkinson was correct in his observation that ancient Omani books refer to Bahlā
as “al-ʿAtīk” and that sometimes the two names are seen as synonymous. Bahlā
and Bilād al-Sirr also supported Yusūf b. Waǧīh against the Imām Rāšid b.
al-Walīd, and the ruling Waǧīhid in Oman. Moreover, Wilkinson believes that the
Makramid (r. 390- 442/945-1055) were transferred from al-ʿAtīk. If this is
correct then it will be a remarkable development in the early stage of the
tribal influence which culminated in the leadership of the Nabhānī.
In the 5th/11th century Oman found itself
under more or less a feudal system since there was no central authority ruling
over the whole country. According to Omani historians: “The Imams ruled in some
regions and the tribal chiefs ruled in other regions”.
This situation provided an opportunity for
the Nabhānīs (who are from ʿAtīk) to assume the leadership of the tribes in
Oman’s interior regions and Bilād al-Sirr. This meant that they had tribal sheikhs
in every area of the country from Ḍank to Nizwā and Samāʾil, and even as far as
the east coast, where they made Qalhāt their harbour.
However, we have no indication that they
were active in Sohar; all we know is that the King of Hormuz continued to
control the judiciary in Sohar in the 10th/16th century. It is in fact probable
that the Nabhānīs were not interested in ruling Sohar due to the fact that the
sea routes in the Indian Ocean had changed during the Middle Ages, particularly
during the 4th and 5th/10th and 11th centuries. Another factor behind Sohar’s
decline was a series of natural disasters and earthquakes which devastated that
great Arab port.
If we want to find out the reasons behind
the rise of the Nabhānī state, our basic source – and perhaps the main source
of information about the early history of the Nabhānī dynasty – is al-Satālī’s
Dīwān (Anthology). The poems in this anthology (and the people it praises) are
the prime source for any student intending to write about early Nabhānī
history. Here however, the paucity of independent information has been a
problem. In our assessment of our own copy of the Dīwān we have
concluded that it is not possible to judge the reliability or otherwise of
al-Satālī’s poems, in view of the fact that they deal with events covering a
period of over a century, from (447-559/1060-1172). Nevertheless, we have
concluded from our examination of the Dīwān, including his reports of
his conversations with the Nabhānīs, that he regarded them as kings. However,
he did not specify any particular royal family as ruling at that time, and he
also mentioned that there were several kings in power at the same time.
In our research into the rise of the
Nabhānī state we should single out Nabhān b. ʿUṯmān for special attention. Our
previous studies indicate that this man was the founder of the state and the
different branches of the Nabhānī families started their ramifications from
him. Some years ago Sayf al-Battāšī (d. 1998) suggested that Abū ʿAbdallāh
Nabhān b. ʿUṯmān was a significant player in the rise of the Nabhānī state. He
enjoyed a reputation as a scholar and faqīh (expert in Islamic
jurisprudence) and was one of the Ahl al-ḥall waʾlʿaqd (“people who
loosen and bind” – i.e. those qualified to appoint or depose a Caliph) at the
end of the 3rd/9th century. In Omani works of fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence) he is referred to as “al-Āʿraǧ” (“the lame one”). He is also
known as the forefather of the Nabhānī clan of Banū Muʿammar, who to this day
lives at the north of Nizwā. However, al-Battāšī states that he does not know
anything about Nabhān b. ʿUṯmān’s ancestry or which tribe he belonged to. This
is despite his assertion that he – i.e. Nabhān b. ʿUṯmān – was the forefather
of the Banī Muʿammar. I have also come across a manuscript of the book Bayān
al-šarʿ, which contains reports on the events in Nizwā during the early
6th/12th century including the Banū Muʿammar family’s rule, as well as
information about some of their leading figures such as Abū ʾl-Hasan b. Abī
ʾl-Muʿammar, Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Abī ʾl-Muʿammar and Nabhān b. Abī ʾl-Muʿammar.
There was also another figure of Nabhānid who was mentioned in the Omani
literature as a king, scholar and a poet Abū Sālim Nabhān b. Abī ʾl-Maʿālī Kahlān
b. Nabhān b. ʿUmar b. Nabhān (c. 7th/13th c.). Some of his writings have been
preserved.
However, a careful review of our previous
studies will reveal that there were actually two Nabhānī families with
different genealogies. They will also show two people with the same name – Abū
ʾl-Ḥasan Ḏuhl – both of whom al-Satālī describes as “the Sultan”. In fact, if
we look closely at the history of the Nabhānī kings and emirs (sayyids),
we will find that there are actually three families with different genealogies
despite the fact that they are all called “al Nabhānī”. However, all three seem
to be descended from Nabhān b. ʿUṯmān b. Aḥmad.
It is my belief that these families
developed separately in three main areas. The first was descended from ʿUmar b.
Ḏuhl b. Nabhān b. ʿUṯmān. They ruled Nizwā, Bahlā and parts of the Ḍāhira
region and were commonly known as the Nabhānī kings. The second ruled Samāʾil,
while the third were descended from Yaʿrub b. ʿUmar and ruled the northern part
of the Ḥaǧar range and settled in Rustāq and Naḫl. This third family’s
descendants were later known as the Yaʿāriba and ruled Oman from 1033/1624 to
1153/1741. This is confirmed by reports showing that Imām Nāṣir b. Muršid was
able to unite the country at the beginning of the 11th/17th century, while his
paternal cousins ruled Rustāq, Naḫl and the surrounding areas as well as the
northern part of the Ḥaǧar range. Meanwhile, the ʿUmayris, who lived in
Samāʾil, also claimed Nabhānīd descent but never claimed that they were “Sultans”,
though they may have had the title of “Sayyid”, which is the equivalent in rank
to “Emir”.
The fragmented nature of the leadership
produced a sort of quasi-regional rivalry and a decentralised form of
government in which there was constant conflict between the dominant tribal
powers and their supporters. The result was that the allegiance felt by the
different conflicting parties towards their respective tribes was reinforced.
In this situation the major tribes in Oman retained their status, while ceding
the overall powers of government to the Nabhānīs, who exercised their rule on a
quasi-decentralised basis. Consequently, historians have found it difficult to
identify the “central Sultan” who enjoyed “universal allegiance”.
On the other hand, the history of the
ruling Imāms during Oman’s first imamate is known in some detail and historians
have been able to trace the history of that period without difficulty, because
those Imāms were able to establish a central government with a capital and a
state with clearly defined borders and powers. Nonetheless, we also find the
names of large numbers of other Imāms featuring in the history books about whom
nothing else is known. Moreover, a considerable amount of information is known
not only about the events during that era but also about the eminent ʿulamāʾ
(religious scholars) who were their contemporaries.
I believe the claim that the history of
Oman consists of no more than books of fiqh and lists of names is based
on the fact that most historians of Islamic history were scholars of
jurisprudence (fuqahāʾ). To put this into a broader context, we can say
that the historians of the Ḥiǧāz and Yemen were indeed fuqahāʾ and,
moreover, that no history as we understand it was written about any region in
the western part of the Gulf until the early 20th century. In my view, history
is actually written in order to confirm, assert and record a particular vision
or point of view, yet this notion is something alien to Omanis because they
never experienced that “sense of difference” which necessitates it and they
already had a strong sense of their own identity.
One important lesson we learn from history
is that a central government creates a state of peace and stability in the
political, economic and intellectual fields. Consequently, if we compare the
“early” and “late” Nabhānī eras, we will find that the “early” Nabhānīs were
unable to establish a central government, while the “later” Nabhānīs were a
clearly recognizable dynasty.
4 Struggling for the authority in Oman:
Imamate versus Monarchy
We can see from the previous chapters how the
conflict between the Nabhānīs and the Yaḥmādis led to a radical change in
tribal leadership in Oman. Historians have recorded some events which show how
power shifted from the Yaḥmad tribes to the ʿAtīk branch of Azd (the Nabhānīs),
thus demonstrating how a family was able to take over the leadership of a tribe
and how that tribe was able to dominate other tribes through a system of
alliances, which enabled it to boost the strength of its leadership in
accordance with the extent and reach of those alliances.
To understand the Nabhānī family’s rise to
power in Oman we first need to understand the tribal system and how the balance
of power changed after the Arabs settled in the south-eastern part of the
Arabian Peninsula. In Oman the tribal chiefs were ranked (from the lowest to
the highest) as Rashīd, then Šayḫ, then, finally Tamīmah.
The Tamīmahs would meet and form alliances with other tribes in which
the alliance would be headed by the most powerful. The leadership’s orientation
would be either tribal/political or tribal/religious. All these elements would
then come under an overall leader called Zaʿīm al-Qabāʾil al-Akbar (“The
Paramount Chief of the Tribes”). A person with this status would be able to
lead and control the other tribes and compel them to submit to his rule on the
basis of the alliance between them. He would be virtually a “Sheikh over the
Sheikhs”.
To see how this change took place in the
tribal leadership system, it would help if we were to follow the sequence of
events in the order in which they occurred.
The second imamate was
established in Oman by two Imāms, Rāšid b. Saʿīd and al-Ḫalīl b. Šāḏān at the
beginning of the 5th/11th century. However, the Yaḥmadis had become more
powerful and were able to influence the choice of Imām, their particular
preference being the family of Imām al-Ṣalt b. Mālik, who was deposed from the
imamate in 275/880. However, the Yaḥmad rule was not an absolute monarchy,
although they governed in much the same style as the princes did under the
feudal system. In the following paragraphs we intend to show how authority
passed between the tribal leaderships in Oman.
Firstly, the election of
Imām Muḥammad b. Abī Ġassān followed the death of Ḫardala b. Samaʿa and his
brother Ǧabr in 549/1154, when he tried to extend his rule over the whole of the
Bāṭina region. Imām Muḥammad b. Abī Ġassān shared the imamate with Imām Muḥammad
b. Ḫanbaš, who died in 557/1162. Subsequently, Imām Muḥammad b. Abī Ġassān came
into conflict with the Nabhānī Sultan al-Muršid b. al-Muršid b. Falāḥ, the
Ruler of Sohar, and this conflict gave the tribes the opportunity to support
the Imām in his struggle against the Nabhānīs, particularly in the Bāṭina
region.59 According to the Sīrat al-Barara by Abū Bakr al-Kindī, the
author of al-Muṣannaf (d. 570/1162), Imām Muḥammad Abī Ghassān also
received a pledge of support from the ʿulamāʾ of the Rustāq School.
Al-Kindī wrote this after the Imām had defeated the people of the Nizwā
district of Saʿāl, when he (al-Kindī) rejected the opinion of his Sheikh Aḥmad
b. Sālīh because of his opposition to the Imām.
In this situation Sulṭān
al-Muršid b. al-Muršid received support from the Bāṭina tribes as well as from
the ʿAbd al-Qays tribes in the region of al-Ḥasā, and they were able to occupy
the town of Sīb (or “Dimāʾ” as it was known in earlier times). They then
occupied the town of Naḫl and a clash took place between the Imām and the
Nabhānīs in the village of al-Ḫawḍ at the entrance to Wādī Samāʾil, in which
the Nabhānīs were defeated. Based on his reading of the epistle statement,
al-Sālimī concludes that al Kindī knew nothing about this.
This would indeed be
surprising in view of the hostilities which had taken place from time to time
since the 5th/11th century between the Omani rulers and the settled tribes in what
was known in ancient times as the region of Baḥrayn, whose allegiance was to
the Nabhānī Sultans. This conflict was evident for all to see during the
imamate of both Rāšid b. Saʿid and ʿUmar b. al-Ḫaṭṭāb al-Ḫarūṣī and may have
been the result of the influential bilateral tribal alliances in al-Aḥsāʾ and
Oman.
Secondly, the election of
Imām al-Ḫalīl b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar b. Muḥmmad b. Ḫalīl b. Šāḏān al-Ḫarūṣī/al-Yaḥmadī
to the Imamate at the end of the 6th/12th century and his seizure of Nizwā and
Rustāq from the Nabhānīs.61 In this conflict tribal loyalties were divided as a
result of the relentless rivalry between the Yaḥmad and the ʿAtīk.
Thirdly, the tribe of Banū Rawāḥa in
Samāʾil were allied with the Nabhānīs and supported Sulṭān Sulaymān b. Sulaymān
al-Nabhānī against the Imamate of ʿUmar b. al-Ḫaṭṭāb al-Ḫarūṣī in 885/1480,
thus bringing to an end the era of the First Imamate. However, a year later al-Ḫarūṣī
was re-elected as Imām and Sulṭān Sulaymān and the Banū Rawāḥa were defeated. Shortly
after this Sultan Sulaymān b. Sulaymān regained power following the death of
Imām ʿUmar b. al-Ḫaṭṭāb al-Ḫarūṣī and took possession of the Ḫarūṣīd possessions
in Bahlā. He subsequently defeated them on al-Ǧabal al-Aḫḍar and the Ḫarūṣīd
Sheikhs fled to the town of Bawšar and al-ʿAliyāʾ in Wādī Banī Ḫarūṣ. This
ended the Yaḥmadī tribes’ power in the interior, a situation that was to
continue for nearly three centuries until they rose again in a different form
through a different series of tribal alliances.
After their state came to
an end and the Yaʿrubis appeared on the scene, the Nabhānīs succeeded in
regaining their power under the leadership of Muḥammad b. al-Ṣalt during the
first era of the Yaʿrubī state and established their emirate in al-Ǧabal al-Aḫḍar.
During this time – in the early 11th century/17th century – the Nabhānīs
abandoned the Banū Rawāḥa in favour of the Banū Riyām, thereby becoming the
head of tribes Tamīma of the Banū Riyām and Emirs of al-Ǧabal al-Aḫḍar –
a situation that was to continue until 1956.
When studying the
Nabhānīs, researchers suffer from the misconception that they were a single
family that ruled Oman, and it is because of this that they tend to accuse
Omani historians of being influenced by their religious Caliphates and the Ibāḍī
ideology. In fact, though, it is clear that the first of the dominant tribes
were the Azdis of Mālik b. Fahm, then the Ǧulandānis, then the Yaḥmad branch of
Azd, then the ʿAtīk branch of Azd, and that this in turn led to the emergence
of a number of separate Nabhānī families. These changes in tribal dominance
began when the Yaḥmad tribes challenged the Ǧulandānis; then it was the turn of
the ʿAtik, and this led to the rise of the Nabhānīs, who have continued as
chiefs of the ʿAtīk to this day.
At the beginning of the
11th century/17th century the Nabhānī star began to fade under a new central
leadership when the Ibāḍī ʿulamāʾ succeeded in electing Nāṣir b. Muršid
in 1624. This marked the end of an era in Oman’s history and ushered in the
Yaʿrubi era and the beginning of Oman’s modern history.
Conclusion
To sum up, this study has
revealed a broader historical picture of the northwestern region of the Indian
Ocean, as well as a somewhat piecemeal view of the contacts and relationships
in the Gulf region and the Arabian Sea as far as the coast of Africa. This in
turn has allowed a clearer picture to emerge of Omani and regional history
after the Mongols conquered Mesopotamia in the 7th/13th century – a time when
the central role of the Abbasid State as the fulcrum of the Islamic State came
to an end and the relationship was broken between the centre and the peripheral
regions of the Muslim world. Consequently, the study has shown that the
peripheral regions developed their own political relationships and new regional
powers began to appear.
Finally, the face of the
region changed fundamentally with the rising competition between the big global
powers and the arrival of the Portuguese in the 10th/16th century.
This paper is rather like a “concave
mirror” in the sense that it has tried to pull together all the different
pieces and attract them towards the centre and, ultimately, achieve a better
understanding of the Nabhānī State that ruled Oman for nearly five centuries –
a period that has proved such a challenge to students and researchers.
Sometimes it has been referred to as the “Dark Ages”, while at others it has
either been seen as a “gap in history” or ignored altogether. This could well
be due to the prevailing “piecemeal view” of Omani history and the shallowness
of the historical sources available, so that consequently every student or
researcher is faced with a scrappy historical picture with no chronological
sequence.
Consequently, it would be
fair to say that this paper is at present incomplete or unfinished. At the same
time, however, it provides a new starting point for students and researchers
today and gives them material to enable them to draw their own conclusions. It
also throws light on a number of obscure, hitherto undiscovered areas, which
can now be linked to present a clearer picture of the Gulf region and the
Arabian Sea after the fall of Baghdad, as well as changes in the region’s
shipping lanes, relations between the states of the region (including tribal
and military, Mameluke and hereditary states), and the different types of
systems of government in the states of the Islamic world.
In its approach to the obscure beginnings
of the Nabhānī State, the paper explains the concept of a tribal state as
opposed to an institution-based state or a hereditary monarchy. It also
examines every case individually so that the composition of each state can be
understood as well as its relations with its neighbours. Our initial hypotheses
have helped us understand the different stages of Oman’s historical development
and Oman’s domestic relationships – i.e. intertribal and tribal alliances,
relations with the Ibāḍī religious authorities and the role of the imamates
within the state system. In doing so, the paper analyses the individual aspects
of these three elements in order to produce a clearer picture of the Nabhānī
State in Oman in its historical context.
Reference:
The Nabhānīs: A
Sketch for Understanding Abdulrahman al-Salimi Editor of Al Tasamoh (Tolerance)
journal, Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, Muscat, Sultanate of
Oman aalsalimi1970@gmail.com / aalsalimi@yahoo.com
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